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Stories that are easy to tell are the ones that tend to be passed 
on, which is perhaps why the usual American version of the story 
of Heidegger's relationship to Aristotle is fairly simplistic: this rela-
tionship is purely negative, insofar as Heidegger's thinking begins 
by overcoming Aristotle's distortion of pure Greek thinking. Walter 
Brogan devotes his latest book, Heidegger and Aristotle, to showing 
that precisely the opposite is true, highlighting instead Heidegger's 
positive appropriation of Aristotle by means of a phenomenological 
interpretation of the great thinker. For those who have drunk deeply 
from the well of Heidegger's commentaries on Kant and Plato, it 
is not surprising that Heidegger had a more complex understanding 
of Aristotle than is often noticed. However, to claim that Aristotle 
is a "hidden interlocutor" (3) in Being and Time is for some at best 
surprising and at worst scandalous. Therefore, Brogan wisely de-
votes an entire book to the defense of this claim, which simulta-
neously promotes sophisticated understandings of Aristotle and 
Heidegger. 
By what right does Heidegger make the anachronistic claim 
that Aristotle is a phenomenologist, or at least an early version of 
one? Brogan wastes no time by stating in the Preface that 
Heidegger's work here depends on translation decisions. Aristotle's 
vocabulary has gone through a process of'Latinization', which is a 
problem for the simple fact that these translations are also inter-
pretations. Brogan cites the most famous example, namely how 
the Greek "ousia" became the Latin "substantia", and was sub-
sequently translated into English as "substance." If we assume for 
the sake of argument that Heidegger is right about Aristotle's origi-
nal meaning of "ousia", then this would be a severely misleading 
translation, as will be seen. The important point is to realize what is 
being implied here by both Brogan and Heidegger, namely that if 
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one held firmly to the Latinized vocabulary, a certain interpretation 
is inevitable. A new interpretation only becomes viable by recast-
ing Aristotle's vocabulary in the original Greek meanings. Thus, it 
is ultimately on the battle hill of etymology that Heidegger's inter-
pretation of Aristotle lives or dies. 
One strong example of this, instructive because of its clarity 
and pith, is Heidegger's focus on the word "epagoge" in the Phys-
ics, traditionally translated as "induction." Heidegger rejects this 
translation because it is already an interpretation that he takes to 
be misleading, and instead leaves the word un-translated. Induc-
tion can be thought of as an empirical approach, where knowledge 
of universals is abstracted from the comparison and contrast of 
various individual beings. Instead, Heidegger thinks that approach-
ing individuals through epagoge is phenomenological because it 
retains the ontological difference, or the difference between being 
and beings. It is able to do this, according to the original Greek 
understanding, because "epagoge means the ability to hold together 
the seeing (nous) of the whole and the seeing (aisthesis) of the 
individual that is constituted by the whole" (27). So it is indeed true, 
as all parties agree, that epagoge involves not only attending to an 
individual being but also achieving knowledge of the whole on the 
basis of the focus on individual beings. But if epagoge is translated 
as 'induction', then Aristotle becomes a thinker completely tied to 
empiricism, understanding the whole by means of checking a se-
ries of individuals and abstracting universals. While this is a stan-
dard translation, Heidegger claims that it leads to a grave misun-
derstanding of Aristotle. For the phenomenologist, being could be 
understood in principle by examining only one being, because we 
may ask what the being is "such that we can 'see ' and 'recognize' 
beings in their being" (27). For Heidegger, the failure to think being 
as different from beings is the perversion of philosophy, and Aristotle 
is not guilty of this on his interpretation. 
In addition to resisting the common error of eliding being and 
beings, Heidegger claims that Aristotle also has a substantial theory 
about being itself. As a phenomenologist, "Aristotle takes the ordi-
nary experience of natural beings as moved beings and asks what 
their being must be if they show themselves in this way" (28). 
Because it is being that allows beings to be seen, beings give us 
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access to being. Brogan simplifies Heidegger's analysis with the 
phrase "kinetic ontology" (xi), because being is movement. The 
title of the book, "The Twofoldness of Being", is illuminated here 
because being has two elements, "emerging into presence...[and] 
preserving itself in this appearance" (34). Insofar as they are kept 
apart, they give rise to the possibility of movement. Insofar as they 
are held together in their separateness, it is possible to read Aristotle 
as thinking being as a unity, although a diverse unity. To refer to a 
previous comment, this is why Heidegger was pained when trans-
lators rendered "ousia" as "substance", because a substance is 
understood as something frozen and static. It is not that Aristotle 
rebelled against the popular notions of being as "permanence and 
endurance", but rather, according to Heidegger, "Being endures in 
the sense that its movement is continuous" (34). 
Although it falls outside the scope of Brogan's thesis, at least 
some evaluation of Heidegger's recasting of Aristotle's vocabu-
lary would certainly be helpful. Heidegger's incessant admonitions 
to return to the 'original' Greek meaning of Aristotle's vocabulary 
leaves us no choice but to wonder whether/how Heidegger is jus-
tified in this task. As it is, Brogan only claims to illuminate the often 
hidden positive appropriation of Aristotle by Heidegger, and to dem-
onstrate that according to Heidegger, Aristotle has a viable phe-
nomenological theory. Perhaps Brogan will save this additional ety-
mological task for a companion volume. If he does produce some-
thing more, it will certainly join this book as immediate canonical 
reading for those English-speakers interested in Continental ap-
proaches to ancient philosophy. 
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